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Abstract 
Economic growth requires growth of energy consumption. In the second half of the 
twentieth century energy consumption began to outgrow its production and the United States. 
Consequently, we observe growing dependence of the U.S. economy on energy imports which is 
causing political and economic insecurity; increasing pollution and depletion of natural 
resources. One way to alleviate these problems is to encourage renewable electricity production. 
Because the electric power industry is the largest consumer of energy sources, including 
renewable energy, it has become one of the most frequent subjects of the regulatory policies and 
financial incentives aiming to stimulate renewable electricity production.  
One of the most promoted renewable energy policies in this industry is a renewable 
portfolio standard (RPS), which requires electric utilities and other retail electric providers to 
supply a specified amount of electricity sales from renewable energy sources. Currently 29 states 
and District of Columbia have the RPSs, while 7 states have goals; but only about two third of 
those with the RPS have certain targets to meet.  
To my best knowledge, there are no studies analyzing compliance with the RPSs targets 
or the role of penalty mechanism in the RPS design on meeting its goal. In my Master Thesis I 
estimate which states are in compliance with their individual RPSs goals and analyze which 
factors affect the probability of compliance, with the focus on the role of penalty size, and 
controlling for complimentary policies promoting renewable energy production. I use a fixed 
effects linear probability model and state level data. Results indicate that including a penalty in 
the RPS design significantly increases the probability that states will comply with their goals. 
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1. Introduction 
Being a key factor of economic growth, energy consumption is positively correlated with 
the gross domestic product (GDP). Growth of the energy consumption in the U.S. was balanced 
with the domestic energy production until the mid-fifties of the 20th century. According to the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, in the second half of the twentieth century 
consumption began to outgrow its production, and the United States lost its energy self-
sufficiency: during the 1949-2009 years, total energy consumption in the USA increased from 
32.0 to 94.6 Quadrillion Btu, while energy production increased from 31.7 to 73.4 Quadrillion 
Btu (US EIA, table 1.1, 2009). Consequently, we observe a growing dependence of the U.S. 
economy on energy imports resulting in political and economic insecurity; increasing pollution 
and depletion of natural resources. 
Total carbon dioxide emissions from the energy consumption in the USA increased from 
4,776.569 million metric tons in 1980 to 5,833.133 million metric tons in 2008 (US EIA, 2008). 
The structure of the U.S. energy supply and demand presented in the figure B.1 indicates that 
petroleum, natural gas and coal together comprise 78.4% of the U.S. energy supply, while 
nuclear electric power accounts for 8.3% of energy supply, while the share of renewable energy 
is only 7.7% (US EIA, 2009). Figure B.2 indicates that from these 7.7% of renewable energy 
35% are produced from hydro-sources, 24% from wood, 20% from biofuels, 9% from wind, 6% 
from biomass waste, 5% from geothermal  and 1% from solar (US EIA, 2010).  
The electric power industry is the largest energy consumer. As one can see from the 
figure B.1, in 2009, the electric power sector consumed 38.3 Quadrillion Btu, from which 48% 
was coal, 22% - nuclear electric power, 18% natural gas, 11% - renewable energy (including 
hydro) and 1% - petroleum. The electric power industry is also the largest consumer of 
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renewable energy (its share in 2009 was 53%), 26% of renewable energy are used in industrial 
production (mostly, paper), 12% - in transportation sector (for production of transportation fuels) 
and 9% for residential and commercial space heating (mostly, biomass). 
Recent debates on climate change are raising public concerns about the environment. The 
public good nature of good environment (it is non-excludable and non-rival) and market failures 
(pollution and natural resources depletion) require government to step in and offer effective 
public policy instruments. Because electric power industry is the largest consumer of energy 
sources, including renewable energy, it has become one of the most frequent subjects of 
regulatory policies and financial incentives aiming to stimulate renewable electricity production. 
First attention to the problems of energy security and dependence on fossil fuels was 
brought by the 1973 energy crises. As a result, the U.S. Congress enacted the National Energy 
Act (NEA) of 1978, which comprised five Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) 
aimed to promote domestic production and the use of renewable energy; it required electric 
utilities to buy power from independent producers, therefore allowing them to enter the market 
and providing guarantee that power they produce will not be wasted. Despite the expiration of 
many contracts signed under it and restructuring electricity markets which gave more freedom to 
independent power producers, PURPA is important because it exempts the developers of 
renewable energy from numerous State and Federal regulatory regimes. Energy Tax Act 
provided income tax credits to residential sector and businesses for renewable energy equipment. 
National Energy Conservation Policy Act (NECPA) obliged utilities to implement energy audits 
and demand management programs. Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act constrained 
construction of power plants based on using oil and natural gas and limited use of oil and natural 
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gas in large boilers. Natural Gas Policy Act restricted the use of natural gas by industrial users 
and electric utilities (was repealed in 1987).  
In the foreword for 2007 report “Freeing the Grid”, annually prepared by the Network for 
New Energy Choices (NNEC), Michael Dworkin, Director of the Institute for Energy and the 
Environment and Professor of Law, ex-chairman of a Vermont Public Service Board emphasized 
that modern energy world faces an “Energy Trilemma” - financial, environmental and security 
constraints (NNEC, 2007).  
Two main types of energy and environmental policy can be offered to ensure sustainable 
economic growth: demand-side policies are focusing on the creating incentives to implement 
energy efficiency solutions in energy consumption, while supply-side policies are developed to 
stimulate renewable energy production. Financial incentives to motivate energy-efficiency and 
renewable energy production in the USA are offered by government at all levels, utilities and 
non-for-profit organizations. They are taking the form of tax credits (for property tax, corporate 
tax, personal and sales taxes), rebates, bonds, loan and grant programs, industry support (i.e. 
alternative energy investment tax credits), bonds, performance-based incentives (feed-in-tariffs, 
renewable energy credit programs) etc. Rules, regulations and policies include 
appliance/equipment efficiency standards, building energy codes, contractor licensing, energy 
standards for public buildings, equipment certification requirements, green power purchasing 
policies, interconnection standards,  mandatory utility green power option, net metering, public 
benefits funds, renewable portfolio standards, solar and wind access laws and permitting 
standards. One of the most promoted renewable energy policies in this industry is a renewable 
portfolio standard (RPS). RPS requires electric utilities and other retail electric providers to 
supply a specified amount of electricity sales from renewable energy sources. Data about the 
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RPSs across the U.S. are collected in the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and 
Efficiency (DSIRE), funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (US DOE). The history of RPS 
policies adoption the USA is shown in the table 1.1. 
Table 1.1. RPSs adoption in the USA 
Year of adoption  States with the RPSs 
1983  IA (105 MW, n.d.)  
1997  MA (4%, 2009 + 1% each year after 2009), NV (20%, 2015)  
1998  CT (27%, 2020)  
1999  ME (30% by 2000, +1% since 2007), NJ (22.5%, 2021), TX (2880 
MW, 2009, 5000 MW, 2015, 10000MW, 2025), WI (10%, 2015)  
2001  IA (1000 MW, 2010)  
2002  CA (20%, 2010), NM (20%, 2020)  
2004  CO (20%, 2020), HI (20%, 2020), MD (20%, 2022), NY (24%, 2013), 
PA (18%, 2020), RI (16%, 2020)  
2005  DC (20%, 2020), DE (20%, 2019), MT (15%, 2015)  
2006  AZ (15%, 2025), WA (15%, 2020)  
2007  IL (25%, 2025), MN (25%, 2025), NC (12.5%, 2020), NH (23.8%, 
2025), OR (25%, 2025) 
2008  MI (10%, 2015), MO (15%, 2021), OH (12.5%, 2025) 
2009  KS (20%, 2010)  
 
The first legislature act related to the stimulation of renewable energy production was 
enacted in the Iowa in 1983 in the form of the Alternative Energy Law. In 1997, Massachusetts 
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and Nevada have adopted RPS policy. Connecticut enacted RPS in 1998, following by 4 states in 
1999. California and New Mexico adopted the RPSs in 2002. Active diffusion of this policy 
started in 2004, when six more states joined this policy. Other 18 states adopted the RPSs during 
the years 2005-2008, following by Kansas in 2009  and Oklahoma with West Virginia in 2010. 
Thus, during the 1998-2010 thirty three more states and District of Columbia have passed the 
RPS legislation. From the map presented in the figure C.1.one can see that by March 2011 
already 29 states and District of Columbia have the RPSs, while 7 states have goals (DSIRE, 
2011).  
These policies are very diverse in terms of eligibility of different alternative energy 
sources, target percentages, and schedule to meet established targets. It is assumed, that this 
policy will create such benefits as environmental improvement, increased diversity and security 
of energy supply, lower natural gas prices (due to higher competition among energy suppliers), 
and local economic development (mostly in rural areas). The main research interest of this paper 
is the compliance of states with their current goals, and it is necessary to review what studies of 
the RPSs policies were already undertaken. 
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2. Literature Review 
As a new public policy, RPSs are actively discussed in literature. The first researchers 
raised questions on the proper policy design and implementation, debating on whether it should 
be adopted on national or state levels. Several papers provide econometric analysis of factors 
leading to RPS adoption. Another stream in the RPS studies includes discussions about expected 
impact of RPS policies (more often using cost-benefit analysis). However, very few papers 
analyze actual effectiveness of RPS policies already enacted. 
Although policy adoption is not the main factor of my study, these papers are helpful in 
choosing variables affecting demand for renewable energy one have to take into account in 
impact studies. Several publications investigating the adoption of RPSs are taking into an 
account four groups of explanatory variables: potential variables (solar and wind potential), 
private interest variables, public interest variables and political ideology. Huang at al. (2007) 
present a cross-sectional analysis for the year 2003, using a logit model of probability to adopt 
RPS policy. They found as significant such factors of RPSs’ adoption as gross state product 
(GSP), growth rate of population, percentage of the population 25 years and over with at least a 
bachelor’s degree, political party dominance and natural resources expenditures. The impact of 
the first three factors is found as positive: the higher GSP, the higher its population growth and 
the more people older than 25 years in this state have at least a bachelor degree, the more 
probability that this state would adopt RPS policy. The impact of political party is found 
negative, as predicted – states with dominant republican ideology are less likely to adopt 
environment-related policies. The coefficient of the natural resources expenditures was found as 
positive, contrary to expectations. The share of coal in electricity generation was not found to be 
significant, the authors expected to find a negative impact of this variable reasoning that states 
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with higher share of coal energy economically depend on coal industry would like to protect it 
from competition and are not be willing to promote alternative energy production to prevent. The 
authors conclude, that “if the federal government would like to promote the RPS policy, focus 
should be more on the states with lower GSP, greater GRP, and lower education levels”. 
Chandler (2009) confirmed as significantly affecting on the RPSs adoption such 
determinants as disposable personal income and government ideology. The author finds that 
population growth rate, industry dependence, and percent of population in non-attainment for 
sulfur dioxide are not significant in explanation RPSs adoption. Chandler also estimated three 
diffusion models, testing the impact of the percent of states already adopted such policy, taking 
into account all the states, or only regional states or only neighbors. He confirmed that diffusion 
is significant factor for RPSs adoption if the similar states (regional or neighboring) have already 
adopted such policy, with regional effect stronger than that of neighbors. Chandler analyzes 
adoption of the RPSs for the years 1997-2008. He uses an event history analysis approach, 
excluding from the model a state once it has adopted a RPS policy. The author recognizes that 
the limitations of his work include weak predictive power of the presented model; non-
significance of three explanatory variables; and exclusion of Iowa, Hawaii and Alaska from their 
analysis; repetition of government ideology scores for 2006 in the years 2007 and 2008 because 
of the absence of these data. The author suggests that in future research it might be more 
interesting to concentrate on the states-“non-adopters”.  
Lyon and Yin (2010) examine factors of adoption for RPS policy in general, and for in-
state requirements in particular. They assume that states with poorer air conditions, higher 
unemployment rates, more environmental group members, stronger renewable industry interests, 
higher LCV (League of Conservation Voters) scores and more congressional seats occupied by 
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Democrats are more likely to adopt RPS policy. They consider data for 1997-2005, excluding 
Iowa, Colorado and the District of Columbia. Following Chandler (2010) Lyons and Yin (2010) 
exclude state from the sample once had adopted RPS. They use logistic conditional probability 
model, assuming that “the conditional probability of RPS adoption varies across period one 
(1997-1999), period two (2000-2002) and period three (2003-2005), but stays constant within 
each period.” They found that main factors driving RPS adoption are “poor air quality 
conditions, strong environmental preferences of the general public and state congress persons, 
and the presence of organized renewable developers in the state”. Contrary to their assumptions, 
authors found that impact of the unemployment rates is negative. They explain this finding, 
suggesting that states which adopt as are less likely to adopt an RPS. 
Policy studies provide necessary background on design and implementation of 
renewable portfolio standards in the United States. For example, Michaels (2008) also points out 
differences in state RPS rules and argues that  national RPS policy would be inefficient because 
it “will not affect the total emission of criteria pollutants, but it will allocate emission rights 
ineffectively”. He also briefly describes RPS policies in Texas, Massachusetts, Nevada, 
Pennsylvania, Colorado and California. Michaels argues that job creation and infant industry 
arguments have no solid ground, and that main reasons to adopt RPS are not economical, but 
political; but his opinion has no objective proof. Rossi (2010) also opposes national RPS, 
disputing that it would cause wealth redistribution from states that lack natural resources to those 
states which are more fortunate to be endowed by renewable potential because of the difference 
in costs and benefits of their implementation. He also argues that direct carbon tax would be 
more effective in encouragement renewable energy production and would have less impact on 
the cost of using renewable. 
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L., Bird et al. (2005) analyze factors driving wind energy development in the USA, 
among which they name renewable portfolio standards, system benefit funds, integrated resource 
planning, property and sale tax incentives, green power markets and wholesale market rules. This 
study does not provide econometric analysis of the marginal contribution of these factors, but 
gives an insight on what control variables might be included when one is looking at the impact of 
RPS policies. 
Swisher and McAlpin (2006) show that “states with renewable portfolio standards have 
a higher average percent of generation from renewable sources” and that “deregulation process 
creates an opportunity for implementation of state policies to reduce emissions”. This study 
suggests that it is necessary to control for deregulation status in the analysis of renewable 
generation. 
Carley (2009) use fixed effects model to analyze factors determining renewable energy 
electricity (total MWh and logged share) using state level-data from 1998-2006. She found that 
political institutions, natural resource endowments, deregulation, gross state product per capita, 
electricity use per person, electricity price and the presence of regional RPS policies are 
significant factors of renewable energy deployment. She concludes that RPS implementation is 
not a significant predictor of the percentage of renewable energy, although she observes its 
increase every year. The main drawback of this conclusion is the used timeframe. Dates when 
RPS policies were enacted maybe different from dates when these policies were put into effect, 
while targets established by these RPSs may be required to reach even at a later date in future: 
from 19 states established RPS by 2006 only ten had targets they had to meet in 2006 
(comparing 2 in 2003). Because the author did not distinguish these dates, reached conclusion 
was wrong. Yin and Powers (2010) employ panel data to investigate the impact of RPSs on in-
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state electricity investment. Taking into account the difference in the stringency of RPS policies 
in various states, they conclude that RPS policies have significant and positive effect on in-state 
renewable investment.  
Cory and Swezey (2007) describe difference in such RPSs’ features as definitions of 
eligible renewable energy sources, the manner in which RECs are treated (ability to bank RECs, 
RECs tradability, tracking systems), compliance rules and enforcement mechanisms. They 
consider as strong those RPS Policy mechanisms those that include non-compliance penalties 
which can take a form of fines or alternative compliance payments (ACP). They classify as 
“weak” RPSs with such features as ambiguous definitions, frequent change of rules and weak 
enforcement mechanisms. This paper does not provide any empirical analysis. Its main 
contribution is broad classification of features that make up difference in RPSs policy designs.  
To my best knowledge, there are no other studies analyzing nor compliance with RPS 
targets, neither the role of penalty mechanism in RPS design on meeting its goal. My main 
research interest is the analysis of the effectiveness of the RPS policies and defining the 
determinants of its successful implementation. Implementation of RPSs can bring about various 
economic, environmental and social benefits. In my opinion, the most important criterion of 
success of the certain RPS is whether it was able to bring about renewable energy electricity 
generation to achieve its goals. I assume that penalty size will play an important role in the 
successful implementation of the RPS: the higher penalty size the more likely that individual 
state will achieve its goal. Thus, in this paper, I am looking at the probability that a particular 
state implemented RPS meets its fractional goals in a given year with the focus on the penalty 
size. In the next paragraph I describe the data and introduce the model I will estimate. 
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3. Data and Model 
All the data about the individual RPSs are derived from the Database of State Incentives 
for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE, 2011). Only 20 states and District of Columbia had RPS 
targets in 2009 or earlier. Two states (Iowa and Texas) are excluded from the analysis because 
their goals are set not as fractions but as capacity size. District of Columbia is excluded because 
of the lack of several variables. Figure A.1. visually represents fractional goals set by 18 states 
subject to his study. Panel is imbalanced because only 2 states had fractional goals in 2003, 1 
more – in 2004, 2 more – in 2005, 4 in 2006, 3 in 2007, 4 in 2008 and 2 in 2009 etc. There are 
totally 68 state-year observations. To find out whether states are in compliance with their 
fractional goals I calculate the share of eligible renewable resources in the total electricity 
resources (REfact) using data on distribution of electricity generated (in MWh) by energy 
sources (coal, geothermal, hydro, natural gas, nuclear, wood and other biomass, petroleum, solar, 
wind and other gases) derived from historical tables (US EIA, 2011). Total renewables include 
geothermal, hydro, solar, wind, wood and other biomass. The total share of renewable in the 
electricity generated is found as the ratio of total amount of electricity generated from renewable 
sources to the total amount of electricity generated, expressed as a percentage. To get REfact 
(see figure C.2), I correct this number if necessary (i.e. deducting hydroenergy in Arizona, 
Connecticut and Montana), while counting only small hydro in California. I get data on small 
hydro from the California Energy Almanac (California Energy Commission, 2011). 
I compare REfact with three parameters: Goal, Goal5 and Goal10. Goal is fractional Goal 
set by the RPS for the particular state and year. Goal5 takes value equal to 95% of the 
established Goal. We need it to find whether goal was met within a 5% margin. Similarly, 
Goal10 takes value equal to 90% of the established Goal and indicates whether state is in 
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compliance with its goal within a 10% margin. I present tables including data about Goal, Goal5 
and Goal10 set in the states of interest in tables A.1-A.3 of Appendix A. Therefore, I use three 
specifications for a binary dependent variable: Y, Y5 and Y10 as following: 
Y= 1 if REfact≥Goal, 0 otherwise        (1) 
Y5= 1 if REfact≥Goal5, 0 otherwise       (2) 
Y10= 1 if REfact≥Goal10, 0 otherwise      (3) 
I use a linear probability model (LPM) with state fixed effects, because I want to make 
conclusions on the fixed set of states and all of my explanatory variables are time-variant. 
The model is a one way fixed effects model:  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=α + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖*β + 𝑍𝑍µ*µ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖        (4) 
Model is called a one-way because it utilizes a one-way error component, consisting of 
individual specific effect and the remainder disturbance, unlike a two-way error component 
model, including also time-effects. Data comprise 18 states (i: 1…18), including Arizona (AZ), 
California (CA), Colorado (CO), Connecticut (CT), Delaware (DE), Illinois (IL), Massachusetts 
(MA), Maryland (MD), Maine (ME), Montana (MT), New Hampshire (NH), New Jersey (NJ), 
New Mexico (NM), Nevada (NV), New York (NY), Ohio (OH), Pennsylvania (PA) and Rhode 
Island (RI). I have at most 7 observations per state (t: 2003…2009). 
X is a matrix of explanatory variables, including penalty or alternative compliance 
payment (PENALTY) in cents per kwh; net metering score (NM_SCORE), electricity price 
(ELPRICE) in cents per kwh, League of Conservation Voters House score (LCV_H), carbon 
dioxide emissions in million metric tons lagged by one year (CO2lag), real gross state product 
per capita (GSP_CAP) in thousands of the U.S. dollars, educational attainment of at least  
bachelor degree by people who are 25 years and older (EDU) as a percentage.  
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Z is a matrix of individual (state) dummies. 
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variable 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Y 
overall 0.40 0.49 0 1 N 65 
between 
 
0.39 0 1 N 18 
Within 
 
0.34 -0.4 1.23 T-bar 3.61 
y5 
overall 0.46 0.50 0 1 N 65 
between 
 
0.44 0 1 N 18 
Within 
 
0.28 -0.34 1.29 T-bar 3.61 
y10 
overall 0.51 0.50 0 1 N 65 
between 
 
0.44 0 1 N 18 
Within 
 
0.28 -0.16 1.17 T-bar 3.61 
 
Table 3.1. shows that during the years 2003-2009 overall 40% of states were in 
compliance with their RPS goals on the percentage of renewable energy by 100%, 46.15% were 
within 5% margin from the established goal, while 50.77% achieved goal within 10% margin. 
Between variation was the lowest for 100% goal achievement (0.3935 or 39.35%), while within 
variation for the same target was the highest. 
Table 3.2. presents statistics for explanatory variables. 
PENALTY is the main variable of interest in this study. Some states have established 
either penalty or alternative compliance payment in dollars per each MWh of non-compliance. 
Other states did not establish any enforcement mechanism. It varied from 0 to 66.03 $/MWh, 
with overall mean $27.93.  
NM_SCORE is score given to states to evaluate the effectiveness of established net 
metering standards which allow electric customers to offset the electricity consumed by the 
amount of electricity they generated if they generate their own electricity. As it is shown in 
14 
figure C.3, derived from the IREC report (Barnes at al., 2009), in September 2009 there were 42 
states enacted net metering standards, which allow consumers who produce their own electricity 
to sell back their excess power reducing their electric bill up to zero. 
Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables 
Variable 
 
Mean St. Dev. Min Max Observations 
PENALTY, USD per 
MWh 
overall 27.93 25.69 0 66.03 N 65 
between 
 
25.69 0 60.70 N 18 
Within 
 
1.41 23.92 33.27 T-bar 3.61 
NM_SCORE, score 
overall 11.64 4.99 0 20 N 65 
between 
 
3.94 6.875 18.5 N 18 
Within 
 
2.98 .14 19.76 T-bar 3.61 
ELPRICE, cents per 
KWh 
Overall 11.96 2.90 7.37 18.06 N 65 
between 
 
2.82 7.65 16.78 N 18 
Within 
 
1.15 8.83 14.54 T-bar 3.61 
LCV_H, score 
overall 68 27.71 0 100 N 65 
between 
 
28.00 0 100 N 18 
Within 
 
8.06 52 109 T-bar 3.61 
CO2lagged, metric tons 
overall 125.74 112.21 10.22 402.15 N 65 
between 
 
111.21 10.57 394.39 N 18 
Within 
 
4.04 112.99 137.44 T-bar 3.61 
GSP_CAPITA, thous. 
USD per capita 
overall 45.55 7.03 33.32 64.96 N 65 
between 
 
7.89 33.73 63.05 N 18 
Within 
 
1.17 41.89 49.02 T-bar 3.61 
EDU, % 
overall 30.71 4.98 20.8 40.4 N 65 
Between 
 
4.74 22.06 38.03 N 18 
Within 
 
0.73 29.06 33.08 T-bar 3.61 
 
Net metering score system was first introduced in 2006. It is calculated as index based on 
several characteristics, such as individual system capacity, total program capacity limits, 
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restrictions on “Rollover”, metering issues, renewable energy credit ownership, eligible 
technologies and customers, there are also bonuses for additional net-metering provisions and 
penalties for standby charges or other fees. States are graded on scale presented in table B.2. Net 
Metering score varied from 0 to 20 with overall mean 11.63846 (“B” grade). Distribution of 
states by net metering grades is shown in the figure C.4 from Barnes et al. (2009). 
Data on League of Conservation Voters score in House (LCV_H) are collected from the 
annual scorecards downloaded from its web-site (League of Conservation Voters, 2010). LCV-H 
scores varied from 0 to 100, which means that there were states where house representatives 
voted for none (0%) to all (100%) environmental statutes. Overall mean was 68, which says that 
observed states have higher than average interest in pro-environmental legislature. Distribution 
of states in 2009 by LCV house-score is shown on the figure C.5. Average electricity prices 
(ELPRICE) in the states during the given time period varied from 7.37 to 18.06 cents per KWh, 
with the mean 11.96 cents per KWh. These data were derived from the EIA web-site. Data on 
carbon dioxide emissions are also derived from the EIA web-site. Carbon-dioxide emissions 
varied from 10.21 to 402.15 mln. metric tons with overall mean 125.74 mln. metric tons.  
To calculate real gross state product per capita, I sourced raw data on current GDP by 
state, GDP deflator and population. Data for current GSP by state (millions of current dollars) 
were derived from two tables: GSP (for 1990-1997) and GDP by State (for 1998-2008) from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (2011). GDP deflator is sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis (2011). Then I calculated real gross state products as follows: 
Real GSP = Current GSP/ Deflator GDP      (5) 
To avoid trendiness I obtain real GSP per capita, using population estimates from the 
U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Real GSP per capita= Real GSP/Population      (6) 
Real GSP per capita varied from 33.32 to 64.96 thousands of the U.S. dollars per capita 
with overall mean 45.55 thousands of the U.S. dollars per capita.  
Data on educational attainment (% of people 25 years and older with a bachelor degree or 
higher) are derived from the Census’ Statistical Abstract of the United States. These data are not 
available for the years 1998 and 2008. We impute data for 1998 (as average of 1997 and 1999). I 
impute data for 2008 implying the average annual growth rate for the observed time-period. 
From 20.8% to 40.4% of people 25 years and older had at least bachelor degree with overall 
average 30.71%. 
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4. Hypotheses and Empirical Results 
In this paper I test several hypotheses, which are the same for all three specifications of 
the dependent variable (compliance with the RPS in 100%, 95% and 90%).  
Hypothesis 1: the probability that a state will achieve their established target goals is 
higher for states with a higher penalty or alternative non-compliance payment, because it makes 
states better of to invest in renewable electricity generation. 
Hypothesis 2: the probability that a state will achieve their established target goals is 
higher for states with a net-metering program enacted and is positively correlated with net 
metering score because effectiveness of net metering defines how easy it is for small energy 
producers to sell the electricity they produced to utility. 
Hypothesis 3: the probability that a state will achieve their established target goals is 
higher for states with higher average electricity prices. Because renewable energy is more 
expansive than traditional sources, renewable energy is not price-competitive with low prices. 
Higher electricity prices encourage investments in the industry in general, and in renewable 
electricity generation, in particular.  
Hypothesis 4: the probability that a state will achieve their established target goals is 
higher for states with higher GSP per capita, because good environment as a public good, and 
therefore a normal good (demand for normal goods increases with income growth). 
Hypothesis 5: the probability that a state will achieve their established target goals is 
higher for states with higher CO2 pollution level if RPS policy was implemented based on the 
environmental concerns: more polluted states should more care about environment and be more 
motivated to develop electricity generation using clean, renewable energy sources. 
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Hypothesis 6: the probability that a state will achieve their established target goals is 
higher for states with higher percentage of educated people over 25 years (with bachelor degree 
or higher), because more educated people are more likely to recognize the negative consequences 
of non-sustainable economic development and to promote green policies and renewable energy 
production. 
I estimate four models for the probability that state will totally comply with its target a 
presented in the columns 1-4.  
Table 4.1. Coefficient estimates for Y as the dependent variable (100% target) 
Explanatory Variable 1 2 3 4 
Constant 2.708*** 
(0.994) 
-2.686*** 
(0.016) 
-6.602*** 
(1.881) 
-16.592*** 
(3.289) 
PENALTY 0.111*** 
(0.032) 
0.111*** 
(0.034) 
0.193*** 
(0.047) 
0.192*** 
(0.045) 
NM_SCORE  -0.001 
(0.016) 
-0.013 
(0.016) 
-0.002 
(0.015) 
ELPRICE   0.147*** 
(0.060) 
0.103 
(0.073) 
LCV_H    0.004 
(0.005) 
CO2_lagged    0.033*** 
(0.010) 
GSP_capita    0.102** 
(0.043) 
EDU    0.043 
(0.058) 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-square 0.2123 0.2123 0.3058 0.4942 
Between R-square 0.0059 0.0059 0.0050 0.0049 
Overall R-square 0.0040 0.0040 0.0042 0.0035 
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In the column (1), I examine how PENALTY itself affects the probability of compliance 
and find that it has a significant and positive coefficient. Without taking into account the other 
factors, an increase in the penalty by one dollar per MWh will increase the probability that a state 
complies with the 100% fractional goal by 11.1 percentage points. In the column (2), I include 
another variable – NM_SCORE, because net metering is a policy which facilitates the RPS 
compliance. Including NM_SCORE did not change the marginal effect of the penalty, but the 
variable itself has no statistically significant impact on compliance. It is possible due to the lack 
of scores for 2003-2005 years, which I imposed on the level of 2006. Adding ELPRICE in the 
model (column 3) has increased the coefficient of PENALTY by almost a half, which means that 
omission of ELPRICE resulted in the negative bias of the PENALTY. This could be a result of 
negative correlation between ELPRICE and PENALTY, if we assume that penalties are not 
necessary to impose when high electricity prices favor to the investments in renewable energy. 
The full model presented in the column (4) is my baseline model. It includes four more variables, 
controlling for demand for renewable energy. According to the columns (3) and (4), net metering 
score (NM_SCORE), LCV_H (LCV score for House representatives) and education (EDU) are 
not significant to explain states’ compliance with their RPS targets. F-test in all four 
specifications gives a strong evidence to reject the hypothesis about zero fixed effects and favor 
fixed effects model. 
Referring to the full model in column (4) of table 4.2, given other factors equal, a one 
dollar increase in the non-compliance penalty increases the probability that a state  complies with 
its RPS target by 19.2 percentage points. The sample mean of the dependent variable is 0.4 for 
full compliance. Therefore an increase of the penalty by a one dollar per MWh  increases the 
probability of full compliance with the RPS from 40% to 59.2%. This is equivalent to 48% 
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([19.2:40.0]*100%) increase in the probability, which is very large impact. An additional million 
metric tons emissions of the carbon dioxide increases the probability that a state will comply 
with its RPS target by 3.3 percentage points, which is equivalent to 8.25% ([3.3:40.0]*100%) 
increase  in the probability of compliance. An additional thousand dollars of the real gross state 
product per capita increases the probability that a state will comply with its RPS target by 10.2 
percentage points, which is equivalent to a 25.5% ([10.2:40.0]*100%) increase  in the probability 
of compliance. In table 4.2, I analyze the probability that a state will comply with its target 
within a 5% margin.  
Table 4.2. Coefficient estimates for Y5 as the dependent variable (95% target) 
Explanatory Variable 1 2 3 4 
Constant 2.589*** 
(0.701) 
-2.449*** 
(0.814) 
-3.820*** 
(1.569) 
-9.826*** 
(2.959) 
PENALTY 0.109*** 
(0.025) 
0.106*** 
(0.027) 
0.135*** 
(0.039) 
0.137*** 
(0.041) 
NM_SCORE  -0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.014) 
ELPRICE   0.051*** 
(0.050) 
0. 031 
(0.065) 
LCV_H    0.002 
(0.005) 
CO2_lagged    0.021** 
(0.009) 
GSP_capita    0.062 
(0.039) 
EDU    0.019 
(0.052) 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-square 0.2920 0.2939 0.3103 0.4158 
Between R-square 0.0074 0.0073 0.0079 0.0062 
Overall R-square 0.0166 0.0163 0.0152 0.0080 
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According to column (4) of table 4.2, with other factors equal, a one dollar per MWh 
increase in the non-compliance penalty increases the probability that a state complies with its 
RPS within 5% of its target by 13.7 percentage points (from 46.15% to 59.85%), which is 
equivalent to a 29.69% ([13.7:46.15]*100%) increase in the probability (also a large impact). 
One more million metric tons emissions of the carbon dioxide increases the probability that state 
comply with its RPS within 5% of its target by 2.1 percentage points (equivalent to 4.55%  
([2.1:46.15]*100%) increase  in probability. In table 4.3. I analyze the probability that state will 
totally comply with its target within 10% margin.  
Table 4.3. Coefficient estimates for Y10 as the dependent variable (90% target) 
Explanatory Variable 1 2 3 4 
Constant -2.956*** 
(0.627) 
-2.882*** 
(0.728) 
-5.000*** 
(1.371) 
-8. 428*** 
(2.673) 
PENALTY 0.124*** 
(0.022) 
0.122*** 
(0.024) 
0.167*** 
(0.034) 
0.171*** 
(0.037) 
NM_SCORE  -0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.009 
(0.012) 
-0.008 
(0.012) 
ELPRICE   0.079** 
(0.043) 
0.092* 
(0.059) 
LCV_H    0.003 
(0.004) 
CO2_lagged    0.017* 
(0.009) 
GSP_capita    0.005 
(0.035) 
EDU    0.018 
(0.047) 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-square 0.3994 0.4000 0.4414 0.4937 
Between R-square 0.0044 0.0044 0.0040 0.0005 
Overall R-square 0.0286 0.0285 0.0272 0.0125 
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Therefore, according to the column (4) of table 4.3, given other things equal, one dollar 
per MWh increase in non-compliance payment or penalty increases a probability that state will 
comply with its RPS within 10% of its target by 17.1 percentage points (from 50.77% to 
67.87%), which is equivalent to a 33.68% ([17.1:50.77]*100%) increase in probability. One 
more million metric tons emissions of the carbon dioxide increases the probability that state 
comply with its RPS within 10% of its target by 1.7 percentage points, which is equivalent to 
3.34%  ([1.7:50.77]*100%) increase  in probability. One more cent per Kwh of electricity price 
increases the probability that state comply with its RPS target by 9.2 percentage points, which is 
equivalent to an 18.2%  ([9.2:50.77]*100%) increase  in probability. Again, F-test of the fixed 
effects for the models presented in tables 4.2 and 4.3 fail to refuse a hypothesis about the absence 
of the fixed effects, favoring fixed effects model. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper I analyzed how penalty measures if they are established in renewable 
portfolio standards affect the probability that a state will achieve its RPS fractional targets (by 
100%, 95% and 90% accordingly). I estimated a fixed effect one-way linear probability model. 
As expected, I found that the penalty has a significant and large impact on the probability that a 
state will comply with its RPS target. Given other factors equal, a one dollar increase in the non-
compliance penalty increases the probability that a state will achieve 100% compliance with its 
RPS target by 19.2 percentage points (equivalent to a 48% increase in probability). Allowing 
states under-compliance within 5% and 10% from the established fractional goal, a one dollar 
per MWh increases the probability that a state will comply with its RPS by 13.7 and 17.1 
percentage points accordingly (equivalent to a 29.69% and 33.68% increase in probability 
respectively). 
So, it is important to include the penalty features in the RPS design if a state wants its 
RPS to be a strong and effective instrument for developing renewable energy. Another 
significant factor of the RPS compliance is pollution, which is captured by the carbon dioxide 
emissions level variable in my model. Given other factors equal, an additional million metric ton 
of emissions of the carbon dioxide increases the probability that a state will comply with its RPS 
target by 100% by 3.3 percentage points (equivalent to a 8.25% increase in probability). When 
we are looking at the compliance within 5% and 10% margins of the goal, the marginal effect of 
the additional million metric ton of the carbon dioxide emissions changes to 2.1 and 1.7 
percentage points (equivalent to 4.55% and 3.34% increase in probability) respectively. The 
above findings show that a state with a higher carbon dioxide pollution level is more concerned 
about developing renewable electricity generation and more likely to meet its fractional goals. 
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Appendix A - Fractional Goals 
Table A.1. Fractional Goals set by RPS 
State 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
AZ       1.25 1.5 1.75 2 
CA   14 15 16 17 18 19 
CO         3 6 6 
CT       5 7.5 10 12 
DE           2 3 
IL             2 
MA 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 11.1 
MD       3.5 3.5 4.505 4.51 
ME           1 2 
MT           5 5 
NH           4 6 
NJ     3.25 3.5 4.576 5.506 6.5 
NM       5 6 6 6 
NV     6 6 9 9 12 
NY 19.752 19.642 18.831 19.843 19.844 19.908 21.675 
OH             0.25 
PA         5.7 5.7 6.2 
RI         3 3.5 4 
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Table A.2. Fractional Goals set by RPS minus 5% 
State 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
AZ       1.1875 1.425 1.6625 1.9 
CA   13.3 14.25 15.2 16.15 17.1 18.05 
CO         2.85 5.7 5.7 
CT       4.75 7.125 9.5 11.4 
DE           1.9 2.85 
IL             1.9 
MA 0.95 1.425 1.9 2.375 2.85 3.325 10.545 
MD       3.325 3.325 4.27975 4.2845 
ME           0.95 1.9 
MT           4.75 4.75 
NH           3.8 5.7 
NJ     3.0875 3.325 4.3472 5.2307 6.175 
NM       4.75 5.7 5.7 5.7 
NV     5.7 5.7 8.55 8.55 11.4 
NY 18.7644 18.6599 17.8895 18.8509 18.8518 18.9126 20.5913 
OH             0.2375 
PA         5.415 5.415 5.89 
RI         2.85 3.325 3.8 
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Table A.3. Fractional Goals set by RPS minus 10% 
State 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
AZ       1.125 1.35 1.575 1.8 
CA   12.6 13.5 14.4 15.3 16.2 17.1 
CO         2.7 5.4 5.4 
CT       4.5 6.75 9 10.8 
DE           1.8 2.7 
IL             1.8 
MA 0.9 1.35 1.8 2.25 2.7 3.15 9.99 
MD       3.15 3.15 4.0545 4.059 
ME           0.9 1.8 
MT           4.5 4.5 
NH           3.6 5.4 
NJ     2.925 3.15 4.1184 4.9554 5.85 
NM     0 4.5 5.4 5.4 5.4 
NV     5.4 5.4 8.1 8.1 10.8 
NY 17.7768 17.6778 16.9479 17.8587 17.8596 17.9172 19.5075 
OH             0.225 
PA         5.13 5.13 5.58 
RI         2.7 3.15 3.6 
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Figure A.1 Fractional goals in States with implemented RPS policies in 2003-2009 
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Appendix B - U.S. Energy Supply and Demand in 2009 
Figure B.1 Structure of the U.S. energy supply and demand in 20091
                                                 
1 http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pecss_diagram.html 
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Figure B.2 Structure of the renewable energy supply in the U.S. in 2009 
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Appendix C - State Characteristics 
  
Figure C.1 States with Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals in 20112
 
 
 
                                                 
2 http://www.dsireusa.org/summarymaps/index.cfm?ee=1&RE=1 
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Figure C.2 Achieved percentage of eligible renewable resources (2003-2009) 
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Figure C.3 States with Net Metering Policy in September 20093
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/net_metering_map.ppt 
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Figure C.4 Grades given to States with Net Metering Policy in 20094
 
 
 
                                                 
4 http://www.newenergychoices.org/uploads/FreeingTheGrid2007_report.pdf 
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Figure C.5 LCV house score by states in 20095
 
 
                                                 
5 http://lcv-ftp.org/scorecard09/2009_LCV_scorecard.pdf 
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Appendix D - Net Metering 
Table D.1. Score Methodology used in 2007-2009. 
Individual System Capacity 
(Max=5, Min=-1) 
 
+5 Greater than 1-MW 
+4 Between 750-kW and 1-MW 
+3 Between 500-kW and 750-kW 
+2 Between 100-kW and 500-kW 
+1 Between 50-kW and 100-kW 
0 Not greater than 50-kW 
-1 Residential systems capped below 20-kW 
Notes: Some permit up to 80 MW on very large loads (such as 
a military base or corporate headquarters campus) 
Total Program Capacity 
Limits (Max=2.5, Min=-0.5) 
+2.5 > 5% or no limit 
+2 Between 2% and 5% 
+1.5 Between 1% and 2% 
+1 Between 0.5% and 1% 
+0.5 Between 0.2% and 0.5% 
0 Between 0.1% and 0.2% 
-0.5 Less than 0.1% 
Bonus +1 For excluding generators that don’t export electricity, 
or measuring basing measurement on energy produced instead 
of total capacity. 
 
Restrictions on “Rollover” 
(Max=1.5, Min=-4)  
+1.5 Indefinite rollover at retail rates. 
+1 Monthly rollover for one year, annual payment at retail rates 
(It is key to limit payout in this case so that customers do not 
oversize their generator 
beyond their own needs. Indefinite rollover is easier.) 
+0.5 Monthly rollover for one year; annual payment at 
wholesale or avoided cost 
0 Monthly rollover for one year; excess energy donated to 
utility annually 
-2 Monthly payment at wholesale or avoided cost 
-4 No rollover permitted; excess energy donated to utility 
monthly  
Metering Issues (Max=2, 
Min=-1) 
+2 Single meter 
+1 Dual meters or dual registers – utility pays for the additional 
meter 
0 Dual meters or dual registers – customer pays for the 
additional meter 
Metering Provisions Under Time of Use 
+2 TOU meters with time bin carryover 
+1 TOU meters with segregated time periods 
-1 Fixed TOU rate disadvantages small generators 
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Renewable Energy Credit 
Ownership (Max=1, Min=-5) 
Points REC Ownership 
+1 Owned by customer 
-5 Transferred to utility 
Eligible Technologies 
(Max=1, Min=-0.5) 
+1 All renewable and zero-emission technologies 
+0.5 Solar and wind included, one or more other renewables 
excluded 
+0.5 All renewables, plus one or more non-renewable 
technologies 
0 Solar only 
-0.5 Solar excluded from standard 
Eligible Customers (Max=2, 
Min=-1) 
+2 No eligible class restrictions 
+1 Commercial at overall net-metering limits, and residential 
larger than 10-kW 
permitted 
0 Residential only, larger than 10-kW permitted 
0 Commercial only 
-1 All other restrictions 
Bonuses for additional net-
metering provisions (Max=5, 
Min=0) 
+1 One customer can aggregate net meter within contiguous 
property 
+1 Utility provides a meter change if needed at utility cost 
+3 “Safe harbor language” protects customers from unspecified 
additional equipment, 
fees, requirements to change tariffs, etc 
Standby Charges or Other 
Fees (Max=0, Min=-5) 
Points Fees 
-1 Minor additional fees for net metering 
-5 Significant additional charges or fees6 
-5 Per kWh fee on all production (in addition to other fees) 7 
 Max: 5+2.5+1.5+2+1+1+2+5+0=20 
Min: -1-0.5-4-1-5-0.5-1+0-5=-18 
 
Thus, each state ih a given year could achieve score as high as 20 or as low as -18. These 
scores were transferred to grades using scale given in table B.2 as follows. 
 
Table D.2. Grades Methodology used in 2007-2009. 
Score 15+ 9-15 6-9 3-6 <3 
Grade A B C D F 
 
Methodology in 2006 was much different: index -8  characterized the program that most 
discourages the goals of net metering, 0 characterized a minimal net metering program, but one 
that does not strongly encourage or discourage program goals, +316: characterizes the program 
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that displays the most features that encourage the goals of net metering. Also scores were 
presented as percentage (from 0 to 100%), and grades “were curved”: A was given from 79% 
and higher, B from 61%. 
We need to change scores in 2006 for 2007 methodology. To be consistent, I rely on 
percentages and define new score as (percentage)*15/20 which is the maximum possible score in 
2007 methodology without/with  bonuses. In table B.3 I present my calculations of NM_SCORE 
in 2006. 
Table D.3. Transfer of 2006 grades in 2007-2009 methodology. 
 Grade Percentage Score 
2006 
Percentage 
*15 
Percentage 
*20 
Score 
2007 
Score 2006 I 
use 
corrected 
avg 
Arizona N/a, voluntary policy 0 
New Jersey A 100 305 15 20 17.5 
A 
17.5 A 
California A 94 15 14 19 15.5 
A 
16.5 A 
Nevada A 88 7 13 17.5 11 B 15 A 
Connecticut C 48% 1 7 9.5 10 B 8 C 
New Mexico C 48% 1 7 9.5 9 B 8 C 
Massachusetts F -1 27% 4 5.5 6.5 C 5 D 
Maryland F -2 9% 1.5 2 16A 2 F 
 
 
 
